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Notes and Comments
JOINDER OF CLAIMS, COUNTERCLAIMS, AND CROSSCLAIMS AS AFFECTED BY VENUE STATUTES OF KENTUCKY
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, upon adopting the new Rules
of Civil Procedure for the state, expressed a goal which they hoped to
attain, namely a ". . . just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
all civil actions."1 This discussion will include some of the venue
restrictions the lawyer will meet in bringing an action in which there
are several claims against the defendant, and also a consideration of
venue problems involved where the defendant has several claims to
be asserted in his counterclaim against the plaintiff, where a thirdparty plaintiff has several claims against a third-party defendant, or
where cross claims are asserted against the co-parties.
Without making an exhaustive analysis of each of the Kentucky
venue statutes, it may be well to restate a few principles before considering the instant problems. Venue, of course, is the place where
trial is to take place, i.e., the particular county or territorial area
within which the cause of action is to be properly brought.2 Whether
or not one has chosen the proper venue depends upon the theory of
his claim, the subject matter of the claim, and the parties, or a combination of these factors, as provided by statute.3 Venue is a privilege
which gives a party the right to have the trial in a certain place, and,
like other privileges, it may be waived if not raised in a timely manner.4 Every state has its own separate venue statutes, and to choose
the proper venue for a particular case, reference must be made to the
applicable statutes.5
Complaint
Rule 18.01 of the new Kentucky rules is a step toward the goal
of just, speedy and inexpensive determinations of all civil actions.
Patterned after Federal Rule 18 (a), Kentucky Rule 18.01 has practically the same wording except that the following provision is added:
'Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Introductory statement to the official edition

of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
'For venue and jurisdiction distinguished, see Stevens, Venue Reform in Kentucky-A Proposal, 40 Ky. L. J. 58 (1951).

'Kentucky Venue Statutes, Ky. REv. STAT. Chap. 452 (1953).
'Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure,Rule 12.08. For an analysis of this rule
as affecting venue under federal practice, see 28 USCA Rule 12, n. 410.
'For a complete study of all the states, see Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis
and Proposed Cure, 49 MicHr. L. REv. 307 (1951).
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The right of the plaintiff to join claims in his complaint is subject to
the statutes governing venue. 6

Thus Kentucky has expressly directed the practicing lawyer to the
venue statutes when he is joining several claims in his complaint.
Since the rule is in substantially the same words as Federal Rule
18 (a), the principles adopted by the federal courts in allowing free
joinder will doubtless also be applied by the Kentucky courts, at least
to the extent permitted by the venue statutes. To illustrate the unrestricted joinder of claims principle which is adopted by the federal
courts, it would be helpful to compare a late Kentucky decision under
the old Kentucky Civil Code 7 with one in a federal court involving
similar facts. In the Kentucky decision s a plaintiff joined in his complaint a contract action, based on an attempted settlement, and an
action in tort for damages to his car. Both of the claims arose out
of an automobile collision involving the plaintiff and the defendant.
The Kentucky court required the plaintiff to elect which cause of
action he would pursue, basing the decision on section 83 of the Kentucky Code. 9 The plaintiff as a result struck his action on the contract,
and sued only for damages in tort. This case reiterated the principle
that causes of action in contract and tort were improperly joined.
In a similar federal case 10 the plaintiff attempted to join an action
for breach of a contract to convey safely with a tort action for personal
injury, both resulting while the plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's vessel. On the defendant's motion to dismiss because the
plaintiff had joined an action in tort with an action in contract, the
federal court denied the motion, holding that the complaint was not
defective for that reason. The court said, ". . . a complaint is not
defective merely because it joins causes of action in tort and in contract.""
'Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 18.01 provides in full: "Joinder of

Claims. The plaintiff in his complaint and the defendant in an answer setting forth
a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many
Claims. The plaintiff in his complaint and the defendant in an answer setting forth

quirements ot Rules 19, 20, and"22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder of
cross-claims or third-party claims if the requirements of Rule 18 and 14, respectively, are satisfied. The right of a plaintiff to join claims in his complaint is subject to the statutes governing venue.
'CABmOLL'S KENTUCKY CODE, Civil Procedure.
8
Folden v. Shelton, 312 Ky. 74, 226 S.W. 2d 531 (1950).
'CARuoLL's KENTuCKY CODE, Civil Practice, sec. 83 provided in part: "Several causes of action may be united, if each affect all the parties to the action,
may be brought in the same county, and may be prosecuted by the same kind
of action; and if all of them be
broughtand
(1)property."
. . . upon contracts, express or implied; or .... (6) for injuries to person
" Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 30 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
' Id. at 790. See also, Atlantic Lumber Com. v. Southern Pacific Co., 2
F.R.D. 313 (D.C. Ore. 1941) (Saying there can be no misjoinder of claims

against the same defendants.)
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From the two decisions compared above, it is seen that a radical
change, from the strict joinder principle of the Code to the free
joinder principle of the new rules, will take place. There could be
many other illustrations. But aside from the rule allowing the plaintiff
to join a great variety of claims against a defendant, the attorney
must look to the Kentucky venue statutes in order to lay his venue
properly as to each claim. In the old Kentucky Code, there appeared
a sharp venue restraint on the joinder of actions. Section 88 provided
that actions could be united if, and only if, each has venue in the same
county. The significance of this restraint is apparent in the analysis of
the case of Wilson v. L. & N. Railroad Co.'2 In that case the plaintiff
attempted to join a claim for negligent damages to personal property,
a claim for damages resulting from delay in shipment, and a claim for
damages for personal injuries. All of these claims arose out of a collison of defendant carrier while the goods were in transit to a point in
Kentucky. Pursuant to the statute governing place of trial of action
against a common carrier, 13 the court held that an action against a
common carrier upon a contract to carry property could properly be
brought in the county where the goods were to be delivered, but an
action for personal injuries could not be brought in that county. Thus
the plaintiff was precluded from joining his claim for personal injuries,
and had to dismiss that cause of action for want of proper venue, since
section 83 of the Code provided that a condition precedent to uniting
several causes of action is that each may be brought in the same
county.
In 1952 the Kentucky legislature repealed section 83, and Kentucky
Rule 18.01 will now govern the right to join actions. The procedure
which will be followed in Kentucky is not clear because no cases on
that point have yet been decided under the new rules. Therefore
decisions under the Federal Rules will be referred to in an attempt to
predict the way in which venue restrictions will apply to the rule governing the right to join actions in Kentucky.
Though Federal Rule 18(a) does not include the sentence regarding the venue restrictions as Kentucky Rule 18.01 does, this will
make no difference in the application of the two rules. This is so because both jurisdictions have Rule 82. Kentucky Rule 82 provides:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of any court of this Commonwealth or the venue of actions therein.

The federal courts in applying this rule have held that statutes govern
venue, and a rule of civil procedure cannot establish venue in a federal
1233

Ky. L. Rep. 985, 112 S.W. 585 (1908).

SCA ROLLS KEicKy CODE,

STAT. see. 452.455.)

Civil Practice, sec. 73 (1948)

(now Ky. REV.
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court.14 Thus, the conclusion to be drawn is that even in the absence
of an express venue provision in Rule 18.01 of the Kentucky Rules,
the lawyer would nevertheless be required to satisfy the particular
venue statutes of his jurisdiction in order to properly join several
actions with venue in different counties.
What then was the purpose of including the reference to venue in
the rule relating to joinder of claims? This manifestation, along with
the repealing of Code section 83, must have some significance. Possibly when the legislature struck the Code provision which prohibited
joinder of causes of action if they could not be sued in the same
county, the sentence concerning venue was put in the free joinder of
claims rule to make it clear that there was not to be absolute freedom
of joinder. The lawyer was reminded that the restriction of venue was
to be placed on the complaint in each instance. That is, if A wanted
to sue B, a common carrier, on a contract to carry goods and for tort
to his person, he would not be able to do so in the county where the
property was to be delivered if the tort occurred elsewhere, because
the statute does not provide for an action for personal injuries to be
brought in the county where the carrier was to deliver the goods. 15
Here, under strict application, the plaintiff would have to strike his
tort action if he wished to continue his suit in the county of delivery
even under the new rules allowing free joinder. On the other hand,
if the tort had occurred in the county of delivery, there would be
nothing to prevent joinder of the two actions under the new rules
although under the old Code the plaintiff would still have had to elect.
It is interesting to note that Texas applies a somewhat different
solution even when the venue of the two claims is different. The defendant there might still not be allowed his venue privilege, in order
that a multiplicity of suits resulting from splitting the actions might be
avoided.', This principle was at one time actually applied in Kentucky, 17 and to do so in the future would help achieve the "just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of all civil actions"' 8 that was sought
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in adopting the new rules.
One state has expressly provided by statute that several causes of
action may be properly joined in one county, though if brought sep" Vaughan v. Empresas Hondurenas, 171 F. 2d 46 (5th Cir. 1948).
'Wilson v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 985, 112 S.W. 585 (1908)
[Applying section 73 of CARmou_'s KErucx- CoDE which is now Ky. Rlv. STAT.

sec. 452.455 (1953)].

"Farmer v. Cassity, 252 S.W. 2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). Texas has
adopted Fed. Rule 18(a), see TmxAs Rotes oF Civ. PRoc., Rule 51.
White v. Harbeson, Judge, 169 Ky. 224, 183 S.W. 475 (1916).
"Supra note 1.
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arately, they would require separate venue. 19 This state also has an
additional statute which empowers the court to separate the causes of
action if trial together would be inexpedient. 20 These two statutes
might well advance the solution to the problems arising from joining
actions with venue in different counties by giving the court discretion
21
to reject the joinder.
Counterclaim
Turning now to another phase of the venue problem in Kentucky,
suppose the defendant wishes to join more than one claim in his
counterclaim against the plaintiff. What venue restrictions will he
have to satisfy, and what right will the plaintiff have to demand dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground that it does not have proper
venue?
Looking at Rule 18.01, it is seen that the last sentence thereof
provides only that the plaintiff's right to join claims is subjected to the
Kentucky venue statutes. The inference from using only the word
"plaintiff," and not including defendant, is that the framers did not
wish to subject to the venue statutes the defendant's right to join
counterclaims. This being so, the defendant would not have to satisfy
the venue statutes when he wishes to join several counterclaims
which, if independently asserted, would have varying venues among
themselves, or different venues from the plaintiffs claim.
Requiring only the plaintiffs adherence to the venue statutes would
seem to be a limitation on venue expressly prohibited by Rule 82,
supra, but the courts do not look at the problem in this way. Although the Kentucky courts have not yet expressed an opinion on this
point under the new rules, the federal courts have decided cases concerning the question of plaintiff's privilege to raise a venue objection.
22
The leading case of GeneralElectric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co.
held a waiver had taken place when the plaintiff brought his suit.
Instead of treating the denial of the plaintiff's right to assert the venue
statutes as an infringement of Rule 82, the venue privileges were said
to have been waived by the plaintiff, and any objection he might
have had to the venue of the defendant's counterclaim could not be
"'FLA. STATUTES, sec. 46.03 (1951) provides: "Suits upon several causes of
action may be brought in any county (or justice's district) where either of the
causes of action arose."

' FLA. STATUTES, sec. 46.08 (1951) provides: "... the court may prevent
the trial of different causes of action together, if such would be inexpedient, and
in such cases the court may order separate records to be made up and separate
trials to be had."
This is the solution advocated by Stevens, Venue Reform in Kentucky-A
Proposal,40 Ky. L. J. 58, 62 (1951).
287 U.S. 430, (1932); noted in 31 Micir. L. REv. 1165 (1933).
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raised after he brought the action. The court stated that "the setting
up of a counterclaim against one already in a court of his own choosing
is very different, in respect to venue, from hailing him into that
23

court."

Permissive and compulsory counterclaims were both included within the waiver that the plaintiff was held to have made in the General
Electric case. Rule 13 divides counterclaims into two distinct classifications. Rule 13.01 deals with a compulsory counterclaim. If defendant
has a counterclaim that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as plaintiff's claim, and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
then he must assert it as a counterclaim. Rule 13.02, dealing with permissive counterclaims, permits a defendant also to present any other
conceivable cause of action that he has against the plaintiff, if he
wishes. Since a permissive counterclaim does not arise out of the
subject matter of the plaintiffs claim, it would seem that the plaintiff
should not be held to have waived his venue objection thereto by
bringing suit. But this distinction carried no weight with the Supreme
Court, for the General Electriccase established that the plaintiff could
not raise his venue objection to any counterclaim, whether compulsory
or permissive.

24

Third-Party Claims
A defendant might wish to assert one or more claims against a
third party. If so, under Kentucky Rule 14, which is in practically the
same language as Federal Rule 14,25 he must move for leave of court
Id. at 435.
Dewey and Almy Chemical Co. v. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., 25 F. Supp.
1021 (E.D. N.Y. 1939) (The plaintiff by coming into the District Court subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the court in respect to all counterclaims). New
York has also taken a firm position by saying that the plaintiff's complaint, not the
defendants counterclaim, governs the place of trial. The court said that "otherwise, the mere interposition of a counterclaim, irrespective of the validity, would
compel the removal of an action .. " Taconic Inn Corp. v. Holoapple, 65 N.Y.S.
2d 262, 263 (1946). See also, 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrcE, secs. 13.16 and

13.22 (1948).
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14, provides in full: "Rule 14.01.
When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. Before the service of his answer a
defendant may move ex parte or, after the service of his answer, on notice to the
plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to assert a claim against a person not
a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him. If the motion is granted, summons and the third-party complaint, with the original complaint attached as an exhibit, shall be served on such
a person, who shall be called the third-party defendant. He shall make his defense
to the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
against the third-p arty plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert against
the plaintiff any defenses which the-third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim.
The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising

KENT-cJOy LAw JouRNAL

to do so, and he will be allowed to assert such claim(s) only against
a party who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him. Whether the third party may raise the question of
venue in such a situation is a complex problem with conflicting decisions. Rule 14, like the other Federal and Kentucky rules, is to
encourage the determination of rights of all parties arising out of one
transaction in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits wherever possible,26
and this should be understood when applying the rule to a situation.
The difficulty in the federal courts centers around whether or not
the third-party proceeding is ancillary to the principal claim to the
extent that no independent venue requirements need be met.2 7 In the

case of Lewis v. United Air Lines Corporation,28 the federal court held
that venue requirements must be met notwithstanding the ancillary
jurisdiction over the claim. This points up the origin of the ancillary
rationalization. The courts in some cases draw the analogy that if
the claim is ancillary as far as jurisdiction, it should be ancillary as to
venue also, and thereby the venue of the original claim between the
plaintiff and the defendant would be that for the case. The Lewis case
repudiates that reasoning, but only a few months after the decision
was reached, another District Court in the case of Morrell v. United
Air Lines Transport Corp.2 9 upheld the opposite view. The court in
the Morrell case said the following:
If there is no necessity for an independent basis of jurisdiction over
the ancillary causes of action set forth in third-party complaints, it
should also follow that 30the venue requirements of an independent
action need not be met.
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter" of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the
third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12
and his counterclaims and cross claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action
against the third-party defendant.
"Rule 14.02. When Plaintiff May Bring in Third-Party. When a counterclaim
is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third-party to be brought in under
circumstances which under this rule would entitle defendant to do so."
' Schram v. Lucking, 81 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. Mich. 1940); U.S. v. Pryor, 2
F.R.D. 382 (D.C. Ill.
1940).
'Cases upholding third-party venue privilege: Lewis v. United Air Lines
Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1939); King v. Shepherd, 26 F. Supp.
357 (D.C. Ark. 1938). For cases treating third party proceedings as ancillary see:
Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. N.Y. 1939);
dictum in Gray v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W.D.
La. 1940).
' 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1939).
'29 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
S°Id. at 758.

NOTES Am CommvETrs

In the Lewis opinion the court discussed the inference which might
be drawn from the language used in official Form 22 which sets out a
third-party complaint. 31 The absence of an allegation of venue and
jurisdiction from Form 22 suggests that the Advisory Committee which
drafted the Federal Rules intended that jurisdiction of the third-party
complaint be ancillary, but the same conclusion could not be drawn
as to venue because venue was an afrmative defense which is not to
be stated in the third-party complaint.3 2 In the special short course
on new Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure held at the University of
Kentucky College of Law, in June, 1953, Judge Parker Duncan of the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky made a statement resembling that concerning Form 22 made in the Lewis case. Judge Duncan said:
Obviously the court could not permit a party to file a third-party
complaint if the court cannot obtain jurisdiction of the third party
defendant. The fact that the court does not have venue of the claim
to be asserted against the third party defendant would not necessarily object [inject?] itself in the discretion of the court on the
motion for a leave to file the complaint. However, if the third-party
raises the question of venue, the court will be required to strike the
third-party defendant.33

In the Kentucky "Tentative Draft" of the new rules, the Civil Code
Committee was hesitant, as was Judge Duncan, to interpret the thirdparty claim to be ancillary to the original claim so that the venue
would be controlled thereby. The underlying reason, as stated by the
Code Committee, was that "[ilf a similar attitude is adopted by Kentucky courts our venue provisions will have been enlarged by the
adoption of the rule provided for third-party practice. There is some
opportunity under such interpretation for collusion .. ."34 This should
not be a controlling consideration, however, in view of the court's
discretionary power to admit or deny a third party claim. 3 5
'See note, 26 VA. L. REv. 376, 377 (1940); note 13 S.CALir. L. REv. 466,
472 (1940).
=Now 4 MooRE's FEDEnAr PrAc-icE, Form 14.03 (1942); For Ky. Form see
ROBERTS, Ky. PRAcncE Foams, 423, 424 (1953).
'Proceedings of Special Short Course on New Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedures, Published by University of Kentucky College of Law (1953) at page 87.
Judge Duncan continues: "This construction seems supported by an abundance of
federal authority although there are some authorities to the contrary for state
courts having ruled to the practice of conforming substantially to the federal rules.
One federal court of appeals of New York and a district court in Missouri extended
the rule of ancillary jurisdiction even to third party practice. This is the only
authority I have found authorizing extending the theory of ancillary jurisdiction
which is necessarily recognized in cases of compulsory counterclaim to the third

party practice."

Tentative Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure of Kentucky, Comment on Rule
14.01, 64.
' Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 Fed. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Ikeler
v. Detroit Trust Co., 30 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mich. 1939) (Dismissed the crossclaim because of collusion to gain jurisdiction).
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A Texas court allowed the third-party defendant to object to the
venue of a claim although in so doing the court admitted that a holding
in accord with the argument in favor of allowing the third-party action
to be ancillary would prevent multiplicity of suits.36 On the other
hand, Arkansas, which has also adopted rules similar to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, has followed the Morrell case by holding
that the venue of the third-party claim is to be governed by the
original venue of the action.37

It appears to the writer that to allow the third-party defendant no
privilege to object to the third-party claim on grounds of venue is
the better solution to achieve the purpose of the rules to avoid
multiplicity of actions. It is difficult to predict which solution Kentucky will choose, but the federal cases, after some original conflicts,
88
have moved toward this solution.

Of course, if the third party cannot raise a venue objection to the
third party complaint filed against him, neither can the original plaintiff. And indeed it has been held that in the interests of disposing of
the controversy at one time, the proper person to raise the objection
that the venue of a claim against a third party is incorrect would be
39
the third party himself, not the original plaintiff.
After the original defendant begins his action against a third party,
Rule 14.01 allows the original plaintiff and the third-party defendant to
assert any claim against each other "... arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against
the third-party plaintiff."40 The federal courts have held that these
claims must have independent jurisdictional grounds to support them. 41
But since these actions must arise out of the original action, and the
venue of the original action has been satisfied, it would seem proper to
treat the venue of them as ancillary and not require them to have an
independent venue. However, one federal case has allowed the thirdparty defendant to object to the venue of a claim asserted against him
by the original plaintiff, and has thereby indicated that the venue
restrictions will have to be met.42 The court said:
'Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 178 S.W. 2d 544 (Texas Civ. App. 1943).
Texas adopted Federal Rule 14 with little change, but later added- a proviso
stating that "this rule shall not be applied so as to violate any venue statutes so
venue would exist absent this rule."
Lacewell v. Griffin, 214 Ark. 909, 219 S.W. 2d 227, 8 A.L.R. 2d 189 (1949).
' Moncrief v. Penn. R. Co., Erie Ry. Co., 73 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1947);

Lesnik v. Public Industrial Corp. v. Davison, 144 F.2d. 968 (2nd Cir. 1944).
Seemer v. Bitter, 25 F. Supp. 688 (M.D. Pa. 1938).

"Supra note 25.
'Pearce v. Penn. R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (Claim by original

plaintiff against the third-party defendant); Morris, Wheeler & Co., Inc. v. Rust
Engineer Corp., 4 F.R.D. 307 (D. Del. 1945) (Claim by third-party defendant
against the original plaintiff).

' Habina v. M. A. Henry Co., Inc., 8 F.R.D. 52 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).

NOTES AND Com ENTs

However desirable it may be to dispose of all interrelated issues in
the same action... and notwithstanding that objections to venue may
be waived, the principle applied in denying the right of a plaintiff
to amend his complaint to assert an independent cause of action
against a third-party defendant in cases where diversity of citizenship
between them is lacking should be applied under the express provisions of Rule 82 . . . in the institution of an original proceeding
against the third-party defendant in a district43in which neither the
plaintiff nor the third-party defendant resides.

One of the purposes of the federal requirement of independent jurisdictional grounds is to keep the proceedings within reasonable limits.
This same reasoning would apply to venue also, and the jurisdiction
rule may yet be extended to the venue of claims between the thirdparty defendant and the original plaintiff.
Cross-Claims
Having thus treated the original complaint, counterclaims and
third-party claims, it is necessary to analyze some of the principles
applied to cross-claims between the parties. A cross-claim is a claim
that is directed against a co-party, and in this way differs from a
counterclaim which is asserted against an opposing party. 44 The crossclaim is governed by Rule 13.07 of the Kentucky Civil Rules, and is,
5
couched in exactly the same language as Federal Rule 13(g).4
A cross-claim that may be asserted against a party must arise "out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of either the
original action or a counterclaim." 46 Thus a cross-claim must be closely
related to the subject of the suit in order to be allowed by the court.
Since it is closely related, the proper rationalization would be to treat
the cross-claim as ancillary to the original suit and not require venue
restrictions to be met.47 The federal courts hold that the jurisdiction
which supports the original claim will be sufficient to support a cross,' Id. at 53. The federal court cites I MooRE's

FEDERAL

PRACTICE 748, note

32, but Moore in 3 Moors FEDERAL PRACTICE 507, note 14 (1948) cites the
Habina case as holding contra to his view.
" In effect the parties are in opposition after filing the cross-claim. See,
3 OHLINcrS FEDERAL PRACTICE, Rule 13(9) (1948).
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure,Rule 13.07 provides in full: "Rule 13.07.
Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein
or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original action. Such
cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or
may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant."
"Ibid.
" This is the view advocated by 3 Mooru's FEDERAL PRACTICE sec. 13.36
and sec. 14.28(3) (1948).
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claim, 48 and it would seem to follow that the venue would be rationalized on the same basis.
A rule which causes a party to waive all his venue objections to a
claim might suggest that in some cases the party will be prejudiced by
its application. If such a situation arises, there is a rule which will
partially protect him .4 9 In both the Kentucky Rules and the Federal.
Rules there is a rule (42.02 and 42(b) respectively) which allows
separation for trial, at the court's discretion, of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party claim in order to avoid prejudice or to
further convenience. Under this rule any party may ask the court to
order a separate trial of any claim, not on the ground of venue, but
on the ground of furthering convenience or avoiding prejudice 0
Conclusion
The right to have trial in a certain county is a statutory right
aimed at placing the adjudication of the question in a convenient
locality by balancing the interests of the parties concerned. Kentucky
has adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to a great extent,
and it is likely, therefore, that the decisions of the federal courts will
be followed in many instances. However, differences in the venue
statutes of the two jurisdictions are likely to cause divergencies in the
solution of joinder problems. In consideration of the foregoing discussion it is submitted that the following principles should be applied
by Kentucky:
1. When A sues B, he may join as many and different claims as he
chooses subject to the right of the defendant to object to the inclusion of any claim whose proper venue is another county.
2. When A sues B, and B counterclaims with several causes of action
against A, A, by bringing suit, is held to have waived any objection
to the venue of B's counterclaims whether compulsory or permissive.
3. When A sues B, and B moves for leave as a third-party plaintiff to
assert several claims against C, C may be allowed to raise venue
objections to the third-party claims against him (though it is recog" Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Lee, 168 F. 2d 420 (1st Cir. 1948); Mathis
v. Ligon, 39 F.. 2d 445 (10th Cir. 1930).
• Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42.02 provides in full: "Se arate
Trials. If the court determines that separate trials will be in furtherance of convenience or will avoid prejudices it shall order a separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, and third-party claims, or issues."
I Michigan Tool Co. v. Drummond, 33 F. Supp. 540 (D.C.D.C. 1938) (Relating to counterclaims).
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nized that the Federal courts have moved in the opposite direction).
A may not raise an objection to the venue of the claims asserted by
B against C.
4. When A asserts several claims against C arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of A's claim against
B, or vice versa, the claims must independently satisfy the venue
statutes.
5. When A sues B and C, and B serves several cross-claims against C
which arise out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of A's claim, the cross-claims are ancillary to A's claim,
and the statutory venue of the cross-claims need not be met.

J. ARNA

GREGoRY, Jn.

FUTURE INTERESTS-ALIENABILITY OF A POSSIBILITY OF
REVERTER IN KENTUCKY
In the recent case of Austin v. Calvert,1 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that a possibility of reverter may be conveyed in this
state. The opinion lacks clarity both in reasoning and terminology, however, and the purpose of this note is to constructively criticize the
case with the hope that a clearer understanding of the problem will
be gained.
In 1918, Austin conveyed an acre of land to a school board by a
deed which provided: ". . . and said land reverts to the donor when it
ceases to be used for a school house." In 1921, the Calverts acquired
by deed from Austin the fee simple absolute title to a 29 acre tract
which included the school house area. In 1931, the school board abandoned the one acre plot and the Calverts claimed fee simple ownership of it. Austin's heirs claimed that his 1918 deed to the school
board created a possibility of reverter in him because the school board
took a determinable fee, and that his future interest did not pass to
the Calverts in his 1921 deed because it was a mere contingency and
could not be aliened or sold. The Court of Appeals decided correctly
that the interest was alienable, but failed to decide what kind of
interest it was, and held that it could be conveyed regardless of
whether it was a possibility of reverter, a reversion, or a "possibility
of reversion." Although this conclusion is sound as a general proposition, it may lead to considerable confusion in future cases because the
court based its decision on certain statutes which it considered con1262 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1953).

